SUBJECT : EUROPEAN STUDIES A
TITLE : Discuss the relative merits/demerits of an agricultural
policy oriented to price reform rather than one based upon
structural reorganisation
GRADE : First Honour
AUTHOR’s COMMENTS : I think it’s pretty okay. Email if anyine has
any comments @ emailprotected
TUTOR’S COMMENTS: Excellent essay! Indepth, critical analysis.
Watch length!!
“The common market shall extend to agriculture and trade in
agricultural products. Agricultural products means the products
of the soil, of stock-farming and of fisheries and products of
first-stage processing directly related to these products….The
operation and development of the common market for agricultural
products must be accompanied by the establishment of a common
agricultural policy among the Member States (1)
From the beginning of the European Union, EU policy has given
emphasis to the agricultural sector. To this end, a Common
Agricultural Policy (CAP) was established in 1963. (2) Provisions
for this policy were made in the Treaty of Rome. The aims of this
policy were to increase agricultural productivity, to ensure a
fair standard of living for the agricultural community, to
stabilise markets and to ensure reasonable prices for the
consumer. (3) This is unusual in the context of the Treaty of
Rome which provided for free trade and movement of resources.
Agriculture was ill-adapted for this approach. Protection was
given, not only by customs duties, but also by a variety of
agricultural policies. This essay will discuss the merits and
demerits of a the pre-1992 CAP with its emphasis on price reform,
in comparison with the post-1992 CAP which was oriented to
structural reform.
It cannot be denied that there were merits of the pre-1992 price
reform policy. There was a bountiful food supply with an
increased variety and quantity of food. Farmers yields
increased, particularly the large farmers. Producers were
protected from the external market due to community preference
and, therefore, domestic agriculture could develop. There were
also spin offs in food production. Although some of the policies
created good returns for farmers, the demerits of said policies
far outweighed any advantages they had. The core-periphery divide
was widened, quantity became more important than quality and
consumers had to pay higher prices. Agricultural practices caused
damage to the environment and international trading relations
were strained.
Until 1993 the EU rarely supported farmers by paying them direct
subsidies from the taxpayers. (4) Instead the 30 billion ECU (and
often more) was spent in the buying up of surplus commodities at
minimum official prices and was also used to pay subsidies to
traders to sell surpluses on the lower-priced world markets. (5)
During the 1960s the price system was devised. The first problem
with price policies is that of fluctuating and differing exchange
rates. Green Money was the first solution to be developed to
counter the problem of differing exchange rates. This, however,
could be manipulated by politicians to achieve different price
levels in the member states than those indicated by the common
price level. The lowering of the green currency towards a
depreciating average rate, raised farms price levels in the
national currency. (6) This meant that while regular citizens
suffered from the devaluation of the currency, farmers were
protected from this trend. Also although the higher prices were
an advantage for the farmer, they were a nuisance for consumers.
Monetary Compensatory Amounts (MCAs) were used in the 1970s when
devaluations by France and revaluations by Germany made Green
Money redundant. MCAs operated as levies on the French exports
and subsidies on French imports. The reverse was applied to
Germany. (7) MCAs, while allowing Community trade to continue
even though common pricing was never established, had more
disadvantages than advantages. They allowed the real level of
prices to vary from country to country. This led to the
distortion of production as farmers in the countries which have
strong currencies, were paid more than farmers in countries with
a weak currency. MCAs are also expensive to operate. MCAs were
replaced in 1979 by the European Currency Unit (ECU) as part of
the European Monetary system (EMS) which had been introduced in
1978. (8) An agricultural ECU which was 14% more valuable than
the ECU was introduced. Until 1993 and 1995, when adjustments
were made to this, vast amounts of officials were needed every
day to administer the agri-monetary system and the monetary
amounts had to be changed weekly. (9) The original agricultural
price policy in CAP had three main components. The first of these
was the target price, which was the basis for establishing all
other prices. It is meant to provide a satisfactory return for
the farmer. Threshold prices are the minimum entry prices for
imports (higher than EU prices for domestic products) and they
also safeguard against the undercutting of target prices. An
intervention price is used if the market prices fall. If surplus
production occurs, the commodities are bought by intervention
agencies. This maintains a minimum market price level. Variable
import levies were used to bring imports up to the threshold
price and export refunds were used to remove the difference
between the common market price and world price. (10) Variable
levies are one of the most effective protective trade policies
used. They protect domestic price guarantees from being defeated
by trade flows. They can sometimes generate revenues and funds
for the central authority controlling the levies. They also can
introduce price stability for internal markets. They have a
number of disadvantages, however. The levy shrinks imports and
losses to the consumer and efficiency are usually caused.
Producer returns can fluctuate more wildly. They can also strain
international relations as the variable levy transfers domestic
demand instability onto the world market. An administrative
mechanism must also be implemented to bridge the gap between the
higher price guarantee and the lower international price, and
this can be expensive to operate as it depends on fluctuating
prices, inflation and supply/demand. (11)
The first problem posed by this three-tiered agricultural policy
system, is the decision as to which system of pricing should be
used. A compromise must be achieved between the highest prices
and the lowest prices. If the highest prices are used production
would be pushed to unacceptable levels. When this policy was
first introduced, it was effective in the atmosphere of the time
and production levels rose. By 1968 however the first of the
fundamental problems with this policy became apparent.
If product prices are prevented from falling while supplies
continue to increase in a competitive market place, costs will
inevitably increase to meet prices and cut off the people and
capital who want to become part of the industry. Price supports,
therefore, increase the costs of production. The irony of this is
that in order to deal with the effects of increased production
costs, price supports must increase also. Although in a
competitive unsupported market this process would mean lower
prices for farmers and consumers, it would also mean hardship for
the marginal farmer. Attempts to stop this by implementing market
support policies are bound to fail however, because the forces of
competition are pushed in a different direction – they are not
removed. The demand for, and the price of, land and equipment
will increase as farmers profits increase. The end result is that
farm costs and output prices increase in tandem. This
marginalises the small farmer even more. Another effect of this
market support policy is that production increases as industry
becomes more productive. This leads to large amounts of surpluses
and therefore more subsidies are needed for these to be sold on
the market. It also becomes more difficult to sell these products
on a market flooded with already large amounts of these
commodities The costs of the policy feed on themselves in order
to increase. Any attempt to lower prices and cut costs, puts us
back where we started. This is the fundamental fault with price
policies in the CAP.
The need for continually updating machinery and equipment for
increased productivity means that much of the money intended for
farmers often flows into ancillary industries and into the owners
of assets who are employed in agriculture. These policies also
encourage increased competition between farmers, and the large
farmer usually benefits at the expense of the small farmer.
Therefore these policies exacerbate the inequalities in the
farming sector. The rigidity of the uniform market price does not
take the differences between various areas of the farming
community into account. As well as this, if there was a
difference in support for Less Favoured Areas (LFAs), then the
question of who should pay would be an issue of some contention.
Co-responsibility levies are also an integral part of CAPs price
policies. The CAP had started its life with unlimited guarantees
of support, regardless of the quantities produced. This led to a
massive agricultural budget. Support price decreases were
introduced and this narrowed the gap between the EC price and the
world market prices. This helped to reduce the EC budget and the
intervention storage costs of the agricultural budget. This route
was not successful for milk, however, and co-responsibility
levies were introduced in 1977. (12) These were, for the most
part, a success because the smaller farmer was then protected
from these the full damage created by price cuts. There were also
gains to the budget. The advantageous effects of the levy were
muted, however, by the tendency of the Council Of Ministers to
raise support prices to offset the impact of levies.
In 1982 the budget costs of CAP had jumped by 11% and the price
policy was once again in crisis. Intervention stocks began to
climb. Generous price rewards in 1981 and 1982 meant that
production levels were high and world markets became saturated.
(13) Quotas were introduced in 1984 to try and force production
more in line with demand. The super-levy was introduced alongside
these quotas. Quotas and super-levies mean that at a wholesale
level, responsibility for the super-levy is determined by the
over-quota production at dairy level. This means generally that
those farms who stayed within the quota would be subsidising
those who over-produce. Quotas, in general, restrict imports in a
given period below the amount which normally would occur. The
disadvantages of quotas outweigh their advantages however. They
stint the domestic market of supplies. Internal prices rise and
buyers curtail their purchases. Domestic producers expand their
output, however, and a glut occurs on world markets which have
depressed prices for affected commodities. Quotas, although
insulating the domestic market from world price changes, can also
amplify domestic price swings. Despite quota introduction,
surpluses remained high and the cost of maintaining the dairy
policy actually increased. The quota levels agreed in 1984 were
far too large and were set from 1983 production figures which
were already 17% above domestic consumption. Also, as these
quotas were only introduced for the dairy sector, production and
surpluses in other areas continued to grow unchecked. Penalties
for over-production were never really implemented and were easily
avoided by raising prices and adjusting MCA rates. (14)
An arable Set Aside policy was introduced in 1988. Producers can
receive payment per hectare on each hectare taken out of
production. Every producer must make more than a minimum area
reduction of 20% to qualify. (15) This was run on a voluntary
basis and farmers received compensation for the land they didnt
use. Small farmers were exempted from Set Aside. The programme
resulted in only a 9% reduction of EU arable area. Production
also increased and intensified as farmers concentrated their
resources on their remaining land. Due to the land being left
fallow, the following years production rates were high as the
land was therefore more fertile. More money than ever since the
price cuts was now being spent on export subsidies.
Relations between the EU and its global neighbours were strained
by CAP. The dictates of the CAP have led to a series of trade
problems. The use of border fluctuations on world markets has
placed the Community in a difficult situation. The CAP protects
internal producers from external competition to some extent. Also
export subsidies ensure that the world market becomes flooded
with cheap commodities which undermine other global commodities.
Depressed world prices occur, interspersed by periods of high
rises in prices. Variable levies were used to bring import prices
to a level higher than that of EU products. The Uruguay Round of
world General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) negotiations
concluded by agreeing a 40% average reduction of tariffs.
Domestic EU support must be reduced by 20% over six years based
on total Aggregate Measure of Support (AMS). All import
restrictions must be converted to tariffs and reduced by 36% over
six years. The volume of subsidised exports must be reduced by
21% over six years. Budgetary expenditure on export subsidies
must simultaneously be reduced by 36% over six years. (16)
The absolute failure of the agricultural price policy of CAP
forced the EU to implement fundamental reform. CAP was producing
large amounts of surpluses and was failing to support the
majority of EU landholders. Support was being concentrated on 20%
of the farmers who were responsible for 80% of the output.
Intensive farming practices were damaging the environment. Since
farmers received a subsidy per tonne produced, they intensified
their farming practices to increase their output and income. Not
only was this leading to surpluses and a massive EU budget, but
also to the destruction of the environment. More fertilisers and
pesticides were being used. There was an increase in the density
of the livestock on the land. Enlargement of farms meant that the
natural habitat was being destroyed and marshlands were being
drained.
Therefore in 1992 there was radical change from a price oriented
policy to a structural policy. There was also a move from price
support to direct income support. It was generally recognised
that a number of structural changes were required. These included
the diversion of land to other uses, the conservation and
protection of the environment, the integration of structural
change with regional economic development and the implementation
of direct income aids. (17) This impetus for change began,
however, in 1988 when the Council of Ministers approved a
regulation 2052/88 which was to reform the operation of the
Structural Funds as part of the European Agricultural Guarantee
and Guidance Fund (EAGGF). (18) This regulation marked an
important shift in structural policy from the individual farmer,
to the region and rural community.
The regulation set out five objectives. Objective 1 status areas
are those which lag seriously behind and need major development
and structural adjustment. These have a Gross Domestic Product
(GDP) of less than 75% of the Community average. It was hoped to
improve living and working conditions, to protect the environment
and to improve processing and marketing of goods. (19) Objective
5b included areas that had a high share of agricultural
employment and a low income level. (20) Objective 5a was a
regrouping of measures which already existed in CAP i.e. funding
for farm improvements, training and social assistance for
farmers. (21) A number of reform and integration programmes were
introduced. Partnership was seen as the way forward and
evaluation of policy success became more important. The
effectiveness of these schemes is questionable however.
In 1992 the MacSharry reforms were introduced. This had three
main aims i.e. early retirement for farmers and farm workers, the
promotion of the use of land for forestry and to promote
environmentally friendly agricultural methods. Farmers are
permitted to retire at 55. They must then transfer their land to
another farmer and will receive a pension from the EU. 50% of the
cost of the pension is paid by the EU and 50% by the national
government. (Although in Objective 1 areas the EU pays 75%.) (22)
When land is not needed for agriculture or is of poor quality, an
afforestation programme is implemented. Maintenance fees are
paid. There is a maximum eligibility of 600 hectares and
therefore the policy favours small enterprises. Again, the EU
pays 50% of the cost or 75% in Objective 1 areas. (23)
The environment is now also seen as an important problem to be
tackled. There have been attempts to reduce pollution e.g. the
Nitrates Objective which tries to reduce the amount of nitrate
pollution in EU waters. Extensification is encouraged to avoid
the damage intensification and concentration have on the land.
Long-term set-aside of 20 years has been proposed. Grants for the
education and training of farmers in environmentally compatible
farming have been implemented e.g. the Rural Environmental
Protection Scheme (REPS) in Ireland. Organic farming is being
promoted and a reduction in the amount of fertilisers and
pesticides used is being encouraged. There has also been a
general move towards trying to ensure that small farmers are not
pushed off the land by larger farmers and discriminating
agricultural policies. Diversification in rural economies is
being encouraged. Integrated rural development programmes have
also been implemented. Rural infrastructure has been improved.
Attempts were made to improve research and development at a rural
level.
The EUs Structural Funds are clearly established as the key
tenet of European level policy initiatives. The Fund consists of
four separate funds – the European Regional Development Fund
(ERDF), the European Social Fund (ESF), the European Agricultural
Guarantee and Guidance Fund (EAGGF) (although only Guidance is
relevant to Structural Funds) and the Financial Instrument for
Fisheries Guidance (FIFG). (24) The Structural Funds are aimed at
reducing regional and social disparities in the EU. Between 1989
and 194 the funds were allocated 10,000 million ECU per annum.
(25)
The EAGGF supports the modernisation of holdings, the processing
and marketing of products and agricultural development measures
and the promotion of local produce. The FIFG is responsible for
the fishing fleet, aquaculture and coastal waters, fishing port
facilities and the marketing of fishery and aquaculture. The ERDF
is responsible for investment in infrastructure, transport,
tourism, communications, environmental improvements and
productive capacity. It also promotes research and development
and provides advice and assistance for Small and Medium
Enterprise (SMEs). Finally the ESF is concerned with vocational
training and counselling, giving aid to self-employed people to
start up a business and education schemes in some priority areas.
(26)
The ERDFs responsibility lies with Objective 1,2 5b and 6 areas.
It promotes the development of the Objective 1 regions who are
lagging behind, helps to counteract industrial decline and helps
reorganise those regions which have a low population density or
whose population is leaving the rural area and migrating to urban
centres. Its main objectives are to foster co-operation between
the local actors of different regions with a view to the exchange
of experiences through transferring knowledge and expertise and
by working together. It hopes also to improve the capabilities
and working methods of local and regional areas in disadvantaged
regions, both economically and socially, so that the regions can
meet the challenges of modern society. (27)
The ESFs aim is to raise the general standard of living by
rendering the employment of workers easier and increasing their
geographical and occupational mobility. (28) It targets in
particular the long-term unemployed, those in danger of losing
their job, young people, women, handicapped people and the
socially excluded. It is governed by Objectives 3 and 4 of the
Structural Funds. The ESF also supports the development of SMEs,
tourism and diversification in Objective 1, 2 and 5b areas. (29)
The ESF improved employment opportunities by implementing
vocational guidance and vocational training courses. It also
helps in job creation and wage subsidy projects. Finally, it
encourages and supports technological development and research.
For the period 1994-1999 the ESF will receive 33.5% of Structural
funding. (30)
The Guidance section of the EAGGF is involved in all agricultural
structural development in the EU. It invests in and aids the
modernisation of farms. It supports extensification, set aside
and environmentally friendly farming practices. It also gives aid
to young farmers and offers early retirement. Aid for
mountainous regions, poor ecological areas and LFAs is given. It
encourages the increased use of agricultural products and
agricultural materials for industry. The Guidance section
essentially covers grants, mostly contributing to the multi-
annual operational programmesope rating under the Structural Fund
Objectives 1, 2, 5a, 5b and6. It is responsible for the
protection of environmentally sensitive areas (for example
intensive valley and marsh grasslands, moorland and hill and
mountain areas), encouraging the reduction or abandonment of
fertilises and pesticides, and maintaining or improving the
upkeep of countryside features such as hedges and walls. (31)
Like the EAGGF, the FIFG provides sectoral assistance which
covers the whole of the European Union, corresponding to
Objective 5a. Actions under the FIFG promote structural measures
in the fisheries sector. It grants money to modernise fleets and
to develop fish farming. It offers protection to some marine
areas. It gives aid to help improve facilities at fishing ports.
It helps in the promotion of products and in the processing and
marketing of fishery products. (32)
A number of rural initiatives have been taken to improve the
structure of agriculture and therefore solve the problems which
had been plaguing European agriculture for decades. A bottom-up
approach has been taken i.e. local and regional initiatives are
supported in preference to nationalinitiatives. According to the
Cork Declaration issued 9th November 1996:-a rural
development policy must be multi-disciplinary in concept, and
multi-sectoral in application, with a clear territorial
dimension…it must be based on an integrated approach,
encompassing within the same legal and policy framework :
agricultural adjustment and development, economic diversification
– notably small and medium scale industries and rural services –
the management of natural resources, the enhancement of
environmental functions, and the promotion of culture, tourism
and recreation. (33)
A bottom-up approach is used with each interested party
submitting a proposal to the EU concerning the improvements that
they would like to make. There are Single Programming Documents
(SPDs) for each eligible area. These identify certain strengths
and weaknesses in an area. All proposals submitted must be based
on a particular Priority and Measure. If possible it should also
complement other priorities and measures contained in the SPD.
(34) The EU will make its decision based on the proposal and its
relation to the SPDs for the area.
An example of such a rural development initiative is the LEADER
programme. This was an EU initiative which was to assist
communities develop their own areas. It was a multi-sectoral and
integrated project. Its aim was to find new and innovative
solutions which would help the development of rural areas and
increase rural integration. LEADER 1 covered 61% of EU land area
and 30% of its population. (35) These were mainly rural areas
with a high dependence on agriculture or problems with a
decreasing population. Tourism and SMEs were targeted.
Accommodation like B&Bs and self-catering hostels were
established. This brought tourism and money into the region and
boosted the local economy as well as providing employment. Small
enterprises, particularly those which specialised in crafts, were
given aid. For example metalwork, textiles, leather, timber and
furniture. Grants were given also to modernise farms and to help
farmers farm more environmentally. The profile of the recipients
who accepted the aid were farmers with above average farm sizes,
who were young and well-educated and had access to information
and capital. (36)
Almost 1,500 jobs were created. (37) Community involvement in
rural areas improved immensely and a sense of local ownership was
fostered. It also created an impetus towards voluntary activities
and encouraged co-operation between existing statutory agencies
and private agencies who had worked together under the LEADER
programme.
An example of one of these LEADER programmes was the West Cork
LEADER. This was established in 1991 with the objective of
developing the local rural economy. (38) A plan was drawn up
through initiatives in key sectors like agriculture, tourism,
food, crafts and fisheries. Partnership was a key element of the
programme. An integrated approach was taken. To date, there have
been 125 projects in this area. For example, there has been a
development in Castletownbare in co-operative fishing along with
the creation and addition of jobs in the processing of fish
products. Diversification was promoted by the development of a
herb farm in west Cork. A new heritage centre was created in
Bandon and a weir project was also begun there to help generate
electricity for a local residential area. (39)
In the UK the EAGGF has given a total of around 145 million
(excluding allocations in Objective 1 regions and under the
Community Initiatives) under Objective 5a for the period 1994-99.
(40) Most measures are aimed at improving competitiveness and
employment, while there are also measures providing for
environmental considerations and for balanced land use and
employment in LFAs. The UK decided on using 63% of the funding to
implement measures concerning processing and marketing. 32% has
been dedicated to developing mountainous LFAs. 5% has been
allocated to investments on holdings. 0.3% will be given as
support for young farmers and producer groups will receive 0.1%.
(41)
A total of around 45 million (excluding allocations in Objective
1 regions) has been allocated to the UK by the FIFG for the
period 1994-99. (42) The UKs Objective 5a SPD for fisheries
concentrates on adjusting fishing effort, modernising and
improving the safety of vessels, adjusting the processing
industry, and developing ports. A measure for taking vessels out
of service is underway for 1993-98. 7% of the fleet has currently
been taken out of service and it is estimated that by the end of
1998 around 12% will have been withdrawn. (43)
Can we therefore say that the post-1992 structurally oriented
agricultural policy is more successful than the pre-1992 price-
oriented one? There are several criticisms which can be levied
against them. Objective regions came to rely heavily on the
funding, and in some cases like Ireland, the increased funds
represented a substantial augmentation of gross national income.
Significant funding-level problems can be seen in examining the
Social Fund’s operation, however. While its allocation increased
from 2% of 1977 expenditure, to an estimated 8% between 1994 and
1999, this is clearly insufficient to withstand the tide of
unemployment in the Community. (44) The Social Fund’s allocation
of resources is not high enough to allow the authorities to
tackle the underlying causes of unemployment. The Social Fund has
been targeted at training and education and limited job creation,
but fails to address the rigidities and barriers in wage markets
and labour mobility. The fund’s sheer lack of financial clout has
meant that it has failed to redress the fact that there are
currently 20 million people unemployed in the EU, with 10
million of these classed as ‘long-term unemployed’. An even more
scathing criticism of the lack of funding provided is that, of
the several targeted Objective 3 and 4 areas which target youth
and long-term unemployment, by 1993, only two had seen employment
growth substantially above the EU average. (45)
A further criticism is the fact that although ten thousand
million ECU were allocated to the funds yearly from 1989 to 1993,
and monitoring agencies were established to ensure the effective
implementation of the Funds, reforms have been severely limited
by the actual funding level. By 1992, only 3% of the EUs Gross
Domestic Product (GDP) was going into the Funds. The benefits of
the new funding system have, however been crucial to several
regions. Increased industrial activity, improved infrastructure,
better farm structures and training of unemployed labour have all
boosted regional economies around Europe.
One final drawback of the Structural Funds is the notion that
the Funds are swimming against the tide of other EU policies,
and thus doomed to failure. The Guarantee section of the CAP
tends to concentrate farming activity in the areas of efficient,
wealthy farms, clearly against the dispersion aspiration of the
Structural Funds. Given the huge commitment of funds to the
Guarantee section of the CAP, the Structural Funds have
clearly an uphill task to dislodge the concentration tendencies.
A cursory glance at the raw data proves that the Structural Funds
have not combated the problems they were created to tackle to a
significant level. Twenty million people are still unemployed in
the EU, and in 1990, GDP per capita in Ireland, Greece and
Portugal was still 50-60% of the EU average. (Although these
figures have since risen e.g. Ireland stands at 104% of the EU
average). (46) While it is true that many worthwhile and indeed
vital projects have been developed by the Structural Funds, the
overall impact on the EU has been mitigated by a combination of
planning, implementation and lack of funding difficulties. The
Structural Funds were designed to reduce the tendencies towards
divergence in the EU, but these largely remain, and unless an
improved financial and developmental base is established, the
Structural Funds will continually fail to address their targets.
It cannot be denied, however, that they have had favourable
effects. In the short period in which they have been in
operation, (Structural Funds did not become important until 1989
and the subsequent MacSharry reforms), the Funds have been
responsible for improving rural co-operation and development.
Farmers are slowly becoming more environmentally aware and using
environmentally-friendly practices. There has been a turnaround
in internal migration patterns with the long-standing rural
exodus being replaced by what has been referred to as an urban
exodus. There is increasing migration from urban centres to
rural areas. This is partly due to improved conditions, services
and infrastructure in rural areas. These developments and
improvements have been facilitated by the Structural Funds.
There has been a dramatic rise in the number in the number of
commuters and an enlargement of commuting catchments. (47) There
has been an increase in the number of people who choose to retire
in the countryside. More importantly there has been an increased
flow of working-class return-migrants. (48) That the increase in
urban to rural migrations was accompanied by a parallel decline
in the opposite flow, was mainly due to changing demographic
factors. Traditionally the rural exodus was basically fed by
small farmers and their families but now, with improving rural
conditions for smaller farmers, this trend is slacking off. There
has also been a rise in the average rural incomes. (49) In
conclusion, this essay maintains that price policies have a wider
range of destructive demerits than they have merits. It can be
seen from EU agricultural policy that the way forward is seen to
be through structural reorganisation. There has been a shift from
a pure agricultural policy, however, to a rural policy whose two
main characteristics are to help maintain a pleasant and
attractive environment through adequate aids to farmers and the
adoption of a bottom-up approach which will integrate rural
communities. The new structurally oriented agricultural policy
costs less money to operate than the former price-oriented policy
and has so far been more successful. More time is required
however in order to determine whether the policy is truly
successful.
FOOTNOTES
REFERENCES
(1) Various Inputs, Internet, (Telecom Eireann, 1998) Treaty of
Rome (as amended):Agriculture
(2) Josling, T.E. & Langworthy, Mark & Pearson, Scott, Options
for Farm Policy in the European Community (Trade Policy Research
Centre, 1981) page 2
(3) Various Inputs, op cit. Treaty of Rome (as amended) :
Agriculture
(4)Gardner, Brian, European Agriculture : Policies, Production
and Trade (Routledge, London, 1996) page 30
(5) Ibid., page 31
(6) Gardner, Brian, op cit., (1996) page 47
(7) Marsh, John S. & Swanney, Pamela J., Agriculture and the
European Community (George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1980) page 31
(8) Ibid.
(9) Gardner, Brian, op cit. (1996) page 49
(10) Grant, Wyn, The Common Agricultural Policy (Macmillan Press
Ltd., 1997)page 67
(11) Houck, James P., Elements of Agricultural Trade Policies
(Macmillan Publishing Company, 1986) page 62
(12) Moyer, Josling, Agricultural Policy Reform (Harvester
Wheatsheaf, 1990) page 60
(13) Ibid., page 62
(14) Gardner, Brian, op cit. (1996) page 54
(15) Burger, Kess & De Groot, Martin & Post, Jaap & Zachariasse,
Vinus, Agricultural Economics and Policy : International
Challenges for the Nineties(Elsevier Science Publishers B.V,
1991) page 64
(16) Various Inputs, op cit. (1998) GATT
(17) Burger, Kess & De Groot, Martin & Post, Jaap & Zachariasse,
Vinus, op cit. (1991) page 105
(18) Ibid.
(19) Various Inputs, op cit. (1998) Agriculture : Regional
Policy and Cohesion
(20) Ibid.
(21) Ibid.
(22) Ibid.
(23) Ibid.
(24) Ibid., Structural Funds
(25) Ibid.
(26) Ibid.
(27) Ibid., ERDF : Aims
(28) Ibid., ESF
(29) Ibid.
(30)Ibid.
(31) Ibid., EAGGF : Aims
(32) Ibid., FIFG : Objectives
(33) Ibid., Cork Declaration
(34) Ibid., Structural Funds
(35) Ibid., LEADER Programme
(36) Ibid.
(37) Ibid.
(38) Ibid., LEADER Programme : Case Study
(39) Ibid.
(40) Ibid., EAGGF : Case Study
(41) Ibid.
(42) Ibid.
(43) Ibid.
(44) Ibid., Structural Funds
(45) Ibid.
(46) Ibid.
(47) Ibid., Cork Declaration
(48) Ibid.
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